of Global Jihad: The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab. +. A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri’s Islamic Jihad Manifesto. Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri . A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-Suri’s Islamic Jihad. Drawing on new sources, the authors argue that Abu Musab al Suri (real name Mustafa Setmariam Nasar), now in U.S. custody, is the principle.

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Revising the History of al-Qa`ida’s Original Meeting with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

New York Review of Books. He later recalled in his memoirs how people like him were denounced as politicos and even heretics by the Salafists: Abu Musab was trying to recruit people to his brigade on the Kabul front, which al-Qaeda did not nusab.

University of Pennsylvania Press. In the autumn of Nasar left London for Afghanistan, operating initially as a lecturer and trainer in the Arab-Afghan camps and guesthouses. Inspired by radio broadcasts from jihadis in northern Lebanon, the year-old Syrian left for Afghanistan in early But it is also deeply incomplete. This website is now defunct, but the author archived it in full circa Archived from the original on 20 January Through this media office he facilitated two important media events for bin Laden in Afghanistan, in particular Peter Bergen ‘s famous CNN interview with bin Laden in March There is little doubt that doctrinaire Salafist influences have profoundly altered the ideological character of the jihadist current since the early s, following decades of Qutbist dominance in militant Islamic rhetoric.

Al-Suri considered the Salafists as a liability and would rather be without them and their doctrinal feuds. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. He then joined the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood organisation in exile, receiving training at their bases and safe houses in Iraq and Jordan.

Al-Suri viewed the various conflicts emanating from the disputes over Salafist doctrine as a significant security hazard for the jihadist movement, and a considerable threat to the movement as a whole:.

Finally, the article argues that this fuller story offers new perspective on the more contemporary development of both the Islamic State and its enemies in Syria and Iraq.


In his books, al-Suri wrote at length describing the destructive role played by the Salafist hardliners in Afghanistan. While the specific issues varied greatly, they all revolved around the general dilemma of how to strike a balance between ideological purity vs. It illustrates that even among jihadis, personality—and personal ambition—matters. The Taliban leadership was divided over the value of Arab jihadis in Afghanistan—especially extremists like al-Zarqawi—but the Taliban governor in Herat, Mullah Jihadwal, was a strong supporter of the Arab movements.

At its core, the Zarqawiist movement that became the Islamic State is a populist rebellion against what it considers the false promises and unfulfilled commitments of more compromising jihadist movements and more compromised jihadist leaders.

Nasar has red hair, green eyes, and a white complexion. From Strategic Texts to “Innovation in Practice ” “. Since the rise of modern political Islamism in the first half of the 20th century, the issue of takfir has probably zl-suri the most divisive one of all. Archived from the original on 14 April True enough, but it was also politically convenient.

But bin Ladin did not accuse Iran mksab of fabricating the story.

Abu Mus`ab al-Suri’s Critique of Hard Line Salafists in the Jihadist Current

Among his associates there were Imad Eddin Yarkas alias Abu Dahdahhead of al-Qaeda’s Madrid cell, who was arrested in Novemberon suspicion of membership in al-Qaida and of involvement in al-ssuri 11 September attacks in the United States.

Until his arrest presumably in Quetta, Pakistan in lateal-Suri was one of the most outspoken voices in the jihadist current. He is the author of The Master Plan: It appears that at some stage Nasar was rendered to Syria, [6] where he was a wanted man.

Nasar’s best known work is the page book The Global Islamic Resistance Call Da’wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah ,usab which appeared on the Internet in December or January al-surii Views Read Edit View history. It began to recirculate on jihadist web forums in Yale University Press, forthcoming. Despite this accuracy, the master plan failed to account for the power, destructiveness, and exclusivity of Zarqawiism, particularly as represented in the Islamic State.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the godfather of the Islamic State, arrived in Afghanistan from his home country of Jordan in late They have four children. Robert Fuller, who interrogated Mr. One of the very few Taliban leaders to have left Afghanistan for jihad, he was more aligned al–suri radical foreign jihadis than most of the Taliban leadership.

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Abu Musab Al-Suri’s Jihad Concept | Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

For the mudab theorists of jihad, Al Qaeda is just the beginning. Al-Suri depicted the Salafists as the most conflict prone of all.

Nasar met Osama bin Laden in Peshawar and claims to have been a member of his inner circle and working for bin Laden until sometime aroundwhen Nasar returned to Spain.

At the time, that was good enough. Architect of Global Jihad: The Arab-Afghans soon became embroiled in tense ideological disputes over whether the Taliban regime should be considered an Islamic emirate, for which it would make it worth fighting and to which emigration was obligatory.

Enhanced interrogation techniques Extraordinary rendition Ghost detainees Waterboarding Destruction of interrogation tapes.

These clashes suggest that the spread of purist Salafist doctrines in the jihadist current from the s onwards has not been a source of strength and renewal, but instead constituted a considerable obstacle to jihadist mobilization, and has more often than not served abj handicap and cripple jihadist groups by embroiling them in schisms and internal conflicts.

Obviously, such contemptuous attitudes opened up serious cleavages in the Arab-Afghan diaspora regarding the future course of action, especially with regard to their position on the Taliban.

Al Qaeda operative captured – Nov 4, “. The rise of Salafist discourses and doctrines has in many qbu reduced the political content in contemporary jihadist ideology and weakened its ability to provide formulas for alliances with other political forces.

Due to his prolific writings on strategic and political issues, and his guerrilla warfare experience, Nasar is a popular lecturer and to a certain degree an unofficial adviser for a wide range of jihadi groups in Afghanistan.