HAMOOD UR REHMAN COMMISSION REPORT PDF
Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report The War Inquiry Commission was appointed by the President of Pakistan in December In its secret report, never. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had only been in power for one week, when he asked the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Hamood-ur-Rehman, to investigate the. The Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report | A Review Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had only been in power for one week, when he asked the Chief Justice of the.
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Search the history of over billion web pages on the Internet. In its secret report, never made deport in Pakistan the commission, headed by then Chief Justice of Pakistan, Hamoodur Rahman, held widespread atrocities, other abuses of power by Pakistani generals and a complete failure in civilian and martial- law leadership responsible for the commisslon of East Pakistan.
The report dwells on a range of sins: It recommended a string of court-martials and trials against top officers.
The Commission examined nearly witnesses and hundreds of remhan army signals between East and West Pakistan. The final report was submitted on October 23,detailing political, administrative, military and moral failings of then Pakistan. The Report PDF version Introduction download Cabinet note download Press release download Chanter 1 download Chapter 2 download Chapter 3 download Chapter 4 download Chapter 5 download Annexure download Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report Introduction Reasons for Supplementary Report This commission of Inquiry was appointed by the President of Pakistan in December, to inquire into and find out “the circumstances in reporf the Commander, Rsport command, surrendered and the members of the Armed Forces of Pakistan under his command laid down their arms and a cease-fire was 2 ordered along the borders of West Pakistan and India and along the cease-fire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Before we submitted that report of necessity we did not have the evidence of most of the persons taken as prisoners of war, including the major personalities, who played a part in the final events culminating in the surrender in East Pakistan with the exception only of Major General Rahim. Although we did our best to reconstruct the East Pakistan story with the help of such material, as was then available, inevitably our conclusions had to be of a tentative character.
We also felt that since we had found reasons adversely to comment upon the performance of some of the major figures involved it would have been unfair to pass any final judgment upon them without giving them an opportunity of explaining their own view point. For this reason we said that “our observations and conclusions regarding the surrender in East Pakistan and other allied matters should be regarded as provisional and subject to modification in the light of the evidence of the Commander, Eastern Command, and his senior officers as and when such evidence becomes available.
Accordingly, after the prisoners of war and the civil personnel who had also been interned with the military personnel in India returned to Pakistan, the Federal government issued a notification directing “that the Commission shall start inquiry at a place and on a date to be fixed by it and complete the inquiry and submit its report to the President of Pakistan, with its findings as to the matters aforesaid, within a period of two months 3 commencing from the date the commission starts functioning.
Altaf Qadir, who had also previously rehkan as Military Adviser to the Commission, was re-appointed as such as also was Mr.
A Latif as Secretary to the Commission. At the request of the commission the government also appointed Col. A Hassan as Legal Advisor. The commission issued a Press Release on the 1st June, offering an opportunity to the prisoners of War and others repatriated from East Pakistan to furnish such information as might be within their knowledge and relevant to the purposes of the Commission.
Commission held an informal meeting at Lahore on the 3rd June, to consider various preliminary matters and then decided to resume proceedings at Abbottabad from the 16th July, In the meantime a number of questionnaires were issued to various rehmam, including those who were ir the helm of affairs in East Pakistan, at the relevant time and others whom we considered reprot to have relevant knowledge.
Statements were also sent repot members of armed forces, civil services and the police services involved and we then proceeded after scrutiny of these statements to summon the witnesses.
We recorded evidence of as many as 72 persons and these included particularly Lt.
The Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report | A Review
The only exception which was unavoidable was that Dr. Malik who till very nearly the end was the Governor of East Pakistan, but in his case also we had firsthand evidence of every important event and we, therefore, now feel ourselves competent to submit our final conclusions.
After the examination of evidence the Commission, finding itself unable ckmmission submit its report for a number of reasons by the 15th of Septemberreprt for time which was extended till the 15th of November and again till the 30th November At the conclusion of the recording of evidence on the 5th September we had to disperse principally because two of us were required to attend the special session of the Supreme Court at Karachi from the 9th to the 21st September, and the Commiission had also to proceeded to Geneva to attend an International Conference.
We, therefore, reassembled on the 23rd of October, at Abbottabad to prepare this Supplement to our main report. Scheme of the Supplementary Commisskon 7.
In general although we have examined a considerable volume of fresh evidence we have found no reason whatever to modify the conclusions that we reached and stated in the Main Cpmmission if anything by reasons of more detailed information we are confirmed in those conclusions.
We, therefore, fehman to avoid a repetition of what we stated in uf Main Report except to some slight degree necessary for restating briefly 5 some of the conclusions with which we are principally concerned in this supplement. There are also some matters upon which our information was then scanty if not negligible and, these we, therefore, propose to deal with in some detail. We do, however, propose to write this, supplement, following the same pattern as far as is practicable, as we did in the main report.
In Part II of that report we dealt with the political background and ir this we now intend to add only matters which occurred inor to be more specific on and after the 25th March, As to Part IV we propose to say nothing in regard to the military aspect in so far as it concerned West Pakistan except to a limited extent as to its repercussions in East Pakistan and as to some controversy that has been raised before us as to rrhman wisdom of opening the Western Front at all.
We then propose to deal with the subject of discipline of the armed forces in East Pakistan which would include the questions of alleged military atrocities in East Pakistan. We shall of necessity, mainly in this part, have to deal with the individual conduct of several persons though aspects of this will emerge from earlier Chapters.
We shall then need to discuss some evidence which has come before us suggesting that there remhan, during the period of captivity in India, hamod efforts on the part of some high officers to present a consistent, if it necessarily accurate, hajood of what took place.
We propose finally to wind up this supplement by making the recommendations. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, on the 26th December, to enquire into the circumstances in which the Commander, Eastern Command surrendered and the members of the armed forces of Pakistan under his command laid down their arms and a cease-fire was ordered along the borders of West Pakistan and India and along the cease-fire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
The other two members of the Commission are Mr. Gen Rtd Altaf Qadir and Mr. The Commission which had started its proceedings in camera in Rawalpindi on the 1st February, recorded evidence of witnesses. It had submitted its report to the then President of Pakistan on the 12th July, In the Report the Commission had observed that its findings with regard to the causes of surrender in East Pakistan were only tentative. It, therefore, recommended that as and when the Commander, Eastern Command and other senior officers who were in India at that time were available, a further inquiry should be hamoor into uur circumstances which led to the surrender in East Pakistan.
Hamoodur Rahman Commission
commissiom Now that all the prisoners of war and civil internees have returned to Pakistan, the Government has asked the Commission to complete this part of its inquiry. A temporary office of the Commission has been set up for the present in the Supreme Court building at Lahore and the Commission has decided that before commencing its proceeding a place to be announced later on the members of the public civil services and the armed forces who were either prisoners of war in India or were otherwise repatriated from East Pakistan should be given an opportunity to furnish to the commission such relevant information as may be within their knowledge relating to the causes of surrender in East Pakistan.
This information should be submitted in writing, preferably 5 copies, as briefly as possible by the 30th June, at the latest to the Secretary of the Inquiry Commission care of Supreme Court of Pakistan, 9 Lahore. The informant should also state whether he will be willing to appear before the Commission.
All such information and particulars of the persons given the information will be strictly confidential. It may be mentioned that according to a public announcement of the Government of Pakistan published in newspapers on the 11th January, all proceedings before the Commission would be in camera and the statements made before and addressed to it would be absolutely privileged and would not render a person making any such statement rehmah to any civil or criminal proceedings except when such statement is false.
The Commission is empowered to call before it any citizen of Pakistan to seek information. The Commission can if necessary even issue warrants to commissionn the attendance of any person unless he is otherwise exempted by law from personal appearance before a Court. Rrehman serving personnel of defence services who are teport to give evidence before the Commission should have no apprehension of rebman for assisting the Commission in its task.
This became necessary in view of the vehement assertions made before the Commission by a large number of respectable witnesses drawn from various sections of society, including highly placed and responsible Service Officers, to the effect that due to corruption arising out of the performance of Martial Law duties, lust for wine and women and commmission for lands rebman houses, a large number of senior Army Officers, particularly those occupying the highest positions, had not only lost the will to fight but also the professional competence necessary for taking renman vital and critical decisions demanded of them for the successful prosecution of the war.
It was asserted by these witnesses clmmission men given to a disreputable way of life could hardly be expected to lead the Pakistan Army to victory. After analysing the evidence brought before the Commission, we came to the conclusion that the process of moral degeneration among the senior ranks of the Anned Forces was set in motion by their involvement in Martial Law duties inthat these tendencies reappeared and were, in fact, intensified when Martial Law was imposed in the country once again in March by General Yahya Khan, and that there was indeed 11 substance in the allegations that a considerable number of senior Army Officers had not only indulged in large scale acquisition of lands and houses and other commercial activities, but had also adopted highly immoral and licentious ways of life which seriously affected their professional capabilities and their qualities of leadership.
We then reportt specific comments on the conduct of certain high officers including the Commander, Hamodo Command, Lt. However, we observed, in Paragraph 35 of that Chapter, that “as we have not had the opportunity of hzmood these allegations cmmission Lt. Niazi any finding in this behalf must await his return from India where he is at present held as a prisoner of war”. We have now hamoor not only Lt. Niazi but certain other witnesses as well in relation to his personal conduct, and the general allegations made against the Pakistan Army during its operations in the former East Pakistan, and are accordingly in a position to formulate our final conclusions in the matter.
Effect of Martial Law Duties 4. In the situation that developed after the military action of the 25th of Marchthe civil administration in East Pakistan practically came to a standstill, and the burden of running the Province fell heavily upon the Army Officers. Their involvement in civil administration continued unabated even after the induction of a sizable number of senior civil servants from West Pakistan, including the Chief Secretary, the Inspector General of Police and at least two Division Commissioners.
According to the Inspector General of Hamoos, Mr. K Chaudhry Witness No.
There was a parallel Martial Law administration at all levels. All wings of administration, relating to law and order were under the control of Martial Law Authorities. Those Bengali Officers who had been restored lacked confidence and were not sure if their loyalties were not suspected. Action was taken against them, even their arrests were ordered without any body knowing about it, including their superiors or the Government of East Pakistan.
The Army’s involvement in civil administration did not come to an end even with the installation of a civilian governor viz. M Malikand the ministers appointed by him. The observations made in this behalf by Maj Gen. Rao Farman Ali Witness No. Malik an old man and politician, had a weak personality. He could not annoy, the Martial Law Administrator Hamoor.
Niazi also reprt of the unsettled conditions obtaining in the Wing. Gen Niazi, on the other hand, cherished and liked power, but 13 did not have the breadth of vision or ability to understand political implications.
Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report – Wikipedia
He did not display much respect for the civilian Governor, The Army virtually continued to control civil administration”. The impression created on the mind of the West Pakistani civilian officials, then serving in East Pakistan, has been stated thus by Mr. Mohammad Ashraf, Witness No.
Malik hhamood his ministers were figureheads only. Real decisions in all important matters still lay with the Army.
A review on Hamood ur Rehman Commission Report | Omer Malik –
I remember the first picture hamoood the new Cabinet. Gen Farman Ali was prominently visible sitting on the right side of the Governor, although he was not a member of the Cabinet. This impression is fortified by rehmzn fact that at a later stage even the selection of candidates for the by- elections ordered by General Yahya Khan was made by Maj Gen Farman Ali. Gen Niazi and some of his subordinate Martial Faw Administrators have no doubt claimed that they allowed full liberty hsmood action to the civilian officials at various levels, but even they have conceded that in the peculiar situation prevailing in East Pakistan after the military action the Army necessarily continued to be deeply concerned with the maintenance of law and order, the restoration of communications and the revival of economic activity in the Province.
The evidence of Officers repatriated from India leaves no doubt that this extensive and prolonged involvement of the Pakistan Army in Martial Faw duties and civil administration had a disastrous effect on its professional and moral standards.
Similar views were expressed before us by Commodore I. Ijaz Ahmad Witness No. The fresh evidence coming before the Commission has thus served commissino to reinforce the conclusions reached by commlssion in the Main Report that the involvement of the Pakistan Army in Martial Law duties and civil administration had a highly corrupting influence, seriously detracting from the professional duties of the Army and affecting the quality of training which the Officers could impart to their units and formations, for the obvious reason that they did not have enough time available for this purpose, and many of them also lost the inclination to do so.
Living off the Land 15 A new aggravating factor made its appearance com,ission East Pakistan hamoood the wake of the military action of the 25th of Marchwhen units of the Pakistan Army undertook “sweep operations” throughout the Province to deal with the Awami League insurgents. The Army had to go out into the countryside without adequate logistic arrangements, and was compelled, at least in the early stages of its operations to take its requirements of foodgrains and other essential supplies from civilian sources.
Unfortunately, however, commissino practice appears to have persisted even when it became possible to make proper logistic arrangements. There is evidence to the effect that civilian shops and stores were broken into by the troops without preparing any record of what was rehmah and from where.
The need for commandeering vehicles, foodstuffs, medicines and commiission essential supplies can certainly be appreciated, but this should have been done under a proper method of accounting so that compensation could be paid on return of normal conditions.
As no such procedure was adopted, it led to a general feeling among the troops, including their officers that they were entitled to take whatever they wanted from wherever they liked. This appears to us to be the genesis of the looting alleged to have been indulged in by the Army in East Pakistan.